

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 ISO-00 SCI-06 AEC-11 CIAE-00

H-03 INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00

RSC-01 NSC-07 DODE-00 DRC-01 NIC-01 EB-11 /171 W

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R 011446Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6218

INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 10559

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, PARM, CY, IT, UR, PO

SUBJECT: ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MORO'S VISIT TO THE USSR

REF: (A) MOSCOW 11645; (B) USNATO 4185

1. EMBASSY OFFICER CALLED ON MINISTER WALTER GARDINI UPON HIS RETURN FROM THE SOVIET UNION WHERE HE HAD ACCOMPANIED FOREIGN MINISTER MORO ON THE JULY 24-29 VISIT. GARDINI IMMEDIATELY VOLUNTEERED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND ITALIAN AMBASSADOR VINCI IN MOSCOW HAD AGREED THAT UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE FULLY BRIEFED ON MORO'S VISIT, AND THAT THE BRIEFINGS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW. HE THEREFORE HOPED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD HAVE OBTAINED A FULL REPORT FROM EMBASSY MOSCOW, BUT NEVERTHELESS ASSURED EMBOFF THAT HE, GARDINI, WAS OF COURSE, AT OUR DISPOSITION. DISCUSSION PROVIDED SOME HIGHLIGHTS SUPPLEMENTING REFTELS, AS WELL AS SOME INSIGHTS OF INTEREST CONCERNING SOVIET VIEWS.

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2. GARDINI SAID THAT WITHOUT RESENTMENT OR BITTERNESS, AND WITHOUT ANY ATTEMPT TO BLAME OTHERS, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOTED, WHILE DISCUSSING THE MIDDLE EAST, THAT "WE FIND WE SIMPLY CAN'T DEAL WITH THOSE PEOPLE" (I.E., ARABS). THE SOVIET HOSTS EXPANDED ON THIS NOTE SAYING THAT TIME AFTER TIME THE SOVIETS HAD HELD IMPORTANT TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS AND GOVERNMENTS, FEELING THAT SOLID UNDERSTANDINGS HAD BEEN HAMMERED OUT, ONLY TO FIND LATER THAT TO PUT THE MATTER GENEROUSLY, THE SOVIETS HAD NOT MADE THEIR POSITION AT ALL CLEAR TO THE ARABS, AND THAT THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY HAD ALSO FAILED TO PERCEIVE THE REAL ARAB POSITIONS AND/OR INTENTIONS. THEY EXPRESSED PARTICULAR PERPLEXITY WITH REGARD TO QADHAFI WHO SEEMED TO BE ONE DAY A MILITANT LEFTIST AND THE NEXT DAY A HARD-CORE REACTIONARY. QADHAFI, THE SOVIET SOURCE SAID, HAD AT ONE TIME PRESENTED A LONG SHOPPING LIST FOR SOVIET HARDWARE AND ASSISTANCE, AND HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO GO AHEAD AND WORK OUT THE DETAILS AT THE APPROPRIATE SOVIET-LIBYAN LEVELS. THAT WAS THE LAST THEY (THE SOVIETS) HEARD OF THE SUBJECT, SAID THE SOURCE. IN SUM, "WE JUST CAN'T DEAL (E.E., COMMUNICATE) WITH THOSE PEOPLE."

3. GARDINI ALSO COMMENTED ON THE PROBLEMS HIS SOVIET OPPOSITE NUMBERS EXPERIENCED IN NEGOTIATING THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. HIS SOVIET OPPOSITE NUMBER PROPOSED A STATEMENT ON CYPRUS WHICH WAS TO INCLUDE THE EXPECTED SUPPORT FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL RESOLUTION, ETC., BUT WHICH ALSO INCLUDED A FIRM STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR AN EARLY RETURN TO CYPRUS AND TO POWER BY MARKARIOS. THE ITALIANS FLATLY REFUSED TO GO ALONG, EXPRESSING A WILLINGNESS, HOWEVER, TO EXPRESS PREOCCUPATION FOR THE EVENTS, AND CALL FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS CONSONANT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 353. THIS FIRM ITALIAN POSITION CAUSED THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS ACUTE DISTRESS. GARDINI SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN GIVEN LITTLE SCOPE IN THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, AND OBVIOUSLY HAD BEEN TOLD TO BRING HOME THE BACON FOR MARKARIOS. ULTIMATELY, THE GLUM SOVIET NEGOTIATOR ASKED GARDINI TO PLEASE PASS THE SOVIET POSITION TO MORO FOR THE MINISTER'S PERSONAL REACTION, AND HE PROMISED FOR HIS PART TO PASS THE ITALIAN POSITION DIRECTLY TO GROMYKO. LATER, AT TBILISI, GARDINI'S OPPOSITE NUMBER CAME TO HIM WITH A BAFFLED EXPRESSION TO REPORT THAT HE HAD SHOWED THE ITALIAN POSITION TO GROMYKO, WHO READ IT QUICKLY AND SAID "FINE, LET'S GO AHEAD WITH THAT." GARDINI SAID EVIDENTLY THE EVOLUTION OF TOP LEVEL CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET POSITIONS ON THE CYPRUS CRISIS WERE MOVING AT A RATE WHICH GREATLY HANDICAPPED THE WORKING LEVEL NEGOTIATORS.

4. CATALANO'S REPORT (REFTEL B) CONSIDERABLY UNDERSTATED GROMYKO'S INTEREST IN PORTUGUESE DEVELOPMENTS, JUDGING BY GARDINI'S COMMENTS. GARDINI SAID THE SOVIETS SHOWED INTENSE INTEREST IN EVERY BIT OF INFORMATION THEY COULD SQUEEZE OUT OF THE ITALIANS ON PORTUGAL AND PORTUGAL'S POSITION AND INTENTIONS IN THE COLONIES. THEY

SEEMED TO FEEL OUT OF THE PICTURE BECAUSE OF THEIR LONG PERIOD WITHOUT DIRECT CONTACTS WITH PORTUGAL AND IN THE PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS.

5. WITH REGARD TO CSCE, SOME PRESS REPORTS HAVE GONE FURTHER THAN REFTEL A, SPECULATING ON A DEAL BETWEEN THE ITALIANS AND THE SOVIETS ON BASKET III. HOWEVER, GARDINI SAID THAT IN A NUTSHELL MORO HAD SUMMED UP THE BASKET III PROBLEM BY TELLING THE SOVIETS THAT WESTERN EXPECTATIONS ARE SO GREAT THAT REPEATED NEGATIVE RESPONSES FROM THE SOVIETS SIMPLY WILL NOT SUFFICE. SOME FULFILLMENT OF EXPECTATIONS IN THE WEST MUST BE OBTAINED AND IT WAS UP TO THE SOVIETS TO FIND SOME WAY TO MAKE AGREEMENT POSSIBLE. ACCORDING TO GARDINI THE SOVIETS RESPONDED WITH A DEADPAN "WE'LL SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE." (COMMENT: THE ITALIANS ARE WARY OF HANGING TOUGH ON BASKET III AND ARE PERHAPS SIGNALLING TO THE SOVIETS THAT SOME REASONABLY COSMETIC PACKAGE COULD PERMIT AN AGREEMENT DESIRED BY ALL PARTIES.) VOLPE

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MINISTERIAL VISITS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION, DEPENDENCY POLICIES, COMMUNIQUE  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 01 AUG 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974ROME10559  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740210-0028  
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**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Office:** ACTION EUR  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** (A) MOSCOW 11645; (B) USNATO 4185  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <14 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MORO'S VISIT TO THE USSR  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MARR, PARM, CY, IT, UR, PO, LY, CSCE, (MORO, ALDO), (GARDINI, WALTER), (QADHAFI, MU'AMMAR)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005